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Abstract — Supply chain management has recently received 
considerable attention with an aim to reduce production 
costs, manage risks, reduce delays, maximize profit, and 
improve the quality of products, with the result of increased 
competitiveness and profitability for all stakeholders.  It is in 
this context that this paper investigates what coordination 
structures (focal, mediated or collaborative) are adopted by 
supply chains in an attempt to conduct integrative planning. 
We investigate what coordination structure is required by 
the focal firm to successfully manage supply chain activities. 
This paper draws on evidence from the extant literature and 
demonstrates the prevalence of the newly defined 
coordination structures in the manufacturing of complex 
products with a multitude supply chain based on findings 
from exploratory case studies. Potential opportunities and 
pitfalls associated with each of the coordination structures in 
regards to governance, supply risk, quality and supplier 
involvement practices are examined. Hypotheses are 
developed to help understand the impact of coordination 
structures on various supply chain activities. Previous 
studies have not considered the potential pitfalls and 
opportunities for the focal firm in choosing to adopt a 
particular coordination structure in the complex products 
manufacturing industry, which poses specific regulatory 
considerations. The two explanatory case studies also 
consider the perspective of tier 2 suppliers, which are not 
commonly considered in the supply chain literature. 
Moreover, this research is able to demonstrate that there is 
no such coordination structure as one size fits all, and 
instead illustrates that even different component supply 
chains in the same organisation can have different 
coordination structures.  
Keywords — Supply Chain Management; Coordination; 
Centralisation; Decentralisation; Collaboration; Information 
Structure; Complex Products Manufacturing, case study  
1. Introduction 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is multidisciplinary 
and inarguably complex. A supply chain aims at 
producing and delivering products to meet customer 
needs at the right time, to the right location, and in right 
quantity through direct and indirect involvement of 
various stakeholders [17], [68]. Collaborative and 
integrative planning among the various echelons of a 
supply chain is one of the most strategic objectives as it 
provides significant opportunities for all stakeholders. 
Most organisations focus only on the management and 
planning of physical and financial resources in the supply 
chain whilst undermining the importance of knowledge 
and information related intangible aspects [8], [80]. When 
managers and decision makers of various supply chain 
tiers have incomplete information and minimal incentive 
to share knowledge  a lack of coordination exists across 
the supply chain [87]. Thus, to achieve supply chain 
objectives, firms need to conduct a series of SCM 
activities [46] or routine processes for the alignment of 
activities in order to achieve efficient coordination [46]. 
This creates an agile and adaptable supply chain [46]. 
Henceforth, a specific consideration of this research is the 
aligning of SCM activities such as quality management, 
governance, risk management and supplier involvement 
practices to facilitate effective coordination in the supply 
chain.  
With this backdrop, we consider the paradox of potential 
opportunities and pitfalls that can be realised when 
adopting approaches that involve direct coordination of 
tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers by the focal firm as opposed to 
the delegated coordination by the focal firm of its tier 2 
suppliers, by their tier 1 suppliers, across the supply 
chain. We describe pitfalls and opportunities as 
mechanisms that deteriorate or enhance value, 
respectively [47].  
Although research interest in the importance of SCM is 
growing, there are notably a number of definitions of 
SCM that exist in the extant literature.  This study 
considers the most relevant definition of SCM by 
McLaren, Head & Yuan [53] as the best fit for the 
purpose of this study. McLaren et al [53] state that SCM 
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“involves the coordination of an organisation’s internal 
planning, manufacturing, and procurement efforts with 
those of its external partners”. This definition in particular 
focuses on the coordination element in SCM that is the 
main focus for this paper. This level of coordination in the 
supply chain requires a well-defined structure [72]. 
Hence, Malone [52] defined coordination structure as a 
“pattern of decision-making and communication among a 
set of actors who perform tasks in order to achieve goals.” 
The context of this study perceives these actors to be the 
focal firm, tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers in a supply chain.   
The allocation of resources towards coordination of 
different aspects of SCM such as governance, supply risk, 
quality and supplier involvement practices, has been 
debated in the extant literature [40], [84], [43], [41]. We 
consider these four dimensions as specific value adding 
supply chain activities. Through focusing on coordination 
of these activities in SCM, focal firms can respond more 
quickly to demand and reduce inefficiencies along the 
supply chain. Therefore, a more specific outcome for this 
research is the amount of coordination and control the 
focal firm should have in order to successfully manage its 
tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers in regards to supply chain 
activities. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Aligning Information Structure with 
Coordination Structure and SCM Activities 
Organisations are accustomed to keeping information, 
such as core competencies, close to them in the form of 
private information [63]. When organisations choose not 
to share information it results in sub-optimal system 
performance leading organisations to resort to formal 
structures to enforce provisions for specific information 
sharing [64]. Benefits in effective information exchange 
can enable the focal firm and their suppliers to leverage 
complementary resources and capabilities with benefits 
such as lower obsolescence and more efficient asset 
utilisation [39].  
 
Anand & Mendelson [4] propose an inherent link between 
the concept of market or supply chain structure and 
information structure, as this is important to the success of 
any supply chain, as evident from the supply chian of Dell 
Computers [44]. Malone [52] defines information 
structure as a structure that determines how members 
perceive and communicate information across the supply 
chain. Anand & Mendelson [4] argue that both the 
information structure and the supply chain structure 
should be aligned and synchronised, especially in regards 
to specific activities in regards to SCM. In this context, 
the ability of organisations to manage the flow of 
information along the supply chain is particularly relevant 
to this study.  
 
It is important to examine the flow of technical 
information along the supply chain and how it can 
contribute towards specific capabilities of the various 
entities in the supply chain [59]. According to Lee [48] 
effective information integration in the supply chain 
requires sharing of demand information, promotion plans, 
demand forecasts, and shipment schedules as well as 
coordination of forecasting and replenishment [65]. This 
level of information can be codified and documented and 
therefore is easily transferable across supply chain entities 
[4]. When this information is embedded in a specific 
context, it has the potential to become valuable 
knowledge [35]. An understanding of a firm’s context 
specific knowledge can enhance an organisation’s 
capabilities as well as contribute to the capabilities of the 
supply chain when it is shared among entities. 
 
The ability to extract knowledge from one place and 
apply it to another is highly sought after. These 
knowledge sharing practices however are dependent upon 
the willingness of groups or individuals to share their tacit 
understanding to provide mutual benefit [26], [74]. Alavi 
& Leidner [3] claim that the most important aspect of 
knowledge management is the potential to extract and 
apply knowledge to where it is needed the most. One 
reason why this practice is so difficult and complex is 
characterised by the fact that some knowledge is 
distinctive to specific contexts including people, 
technology, structures and environmental conditions [6]. 
Moreover, not all types of knowledge are equally 
transferable which consequently requires the development 
of routine, systems and practices for sharing knowledge 
among organisations [5]. Since the conception of terms 
such as knowledge management the focus of 
organisations has shifted to how tacit knowledge can be 
extracted from a context and applied to another based on 
an organisations needs, this type of knowledge is hard to 
transfer [74]. Explicit knowledge on the other hand, is 
more easily shared [57].  
 
Anand & Mendelson [4] believe that information 
structure and information systems underpin an integrated 
architecture for a supply chain. In essence, information 
systems can be used for effective SCM in providing 
timely planning and information processing along the 
entire supply chain, if managed appropriately. 
 
2.2 Information Systems 
Organisations in the present business environment are 
demanding visibility of their supply chain through an 
integrated approach. However, implementing the best 
information system infrastructure does not guarantee 
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effective supply chain management [23]. This suggests 
that information systems or information communication 
technologies (ICT) are merely a support structure in SCM 
and not a process in itself that breeds superior 
performance in the supply chain. ICT includes 
technologies such as the Internet, intranet, electronic data 
interchange (EDI), enterprise resource planning systems, 
and the use of email for constant communication. When 
information or data is received and shared across the 
supply chain through deployment of information systems, 
it is rendered into knowledge through its application, and 
therefore can lead to enhanced decision-making and 
consequently improvements in business process 
performance [58],[62].   
 
Investment in ICT infrastructure in the supply chain has 
the potential to free buyers and management from day-to-
day problems and enables them to focus on long-term 
analytic work and planning [41]. “Relationship-specific 
IT investments undertaken by one or both parties through 
customisation enhance the integration of the supplier’s IT 
solutions and the buyer’s IT Infrastructure” [39]. Further 
benefits of an improved IT infrastructure include price 
reduction or savings, inventory reduction, reduced clerical 
work, and better delivery and service [41]. Delayed, 
scarce or distorted information hold serious ramifications 
in the supply chain [61]. Therefore, integrated 
information systems for information and knowledge 
sharing processes play a pivotal role in adding value in 
supply chain activities [28]. Integrated information 
systems need to be embedded into organisations so that 
they can link coordination structures and relevant supply 
chain activities across supply chains.  
 
In the next section, we will analyse a variety of theoretical 
paradigms that are particularly relevant to SCM and more 
specifically to the context of this research in regards to 
coordination structures. This will include theories such as 
agency theory, transaction cost theory and lastly 
coordination theory. 
 
3. Theoretical Frameworks 
Coordination theory provides the backbone for this paper 
as it provides the basis for the supply chain structures, 
however transactional cost theory and agency theory are 
equally applicable for the context of this research. 
 
 
3.1       Agency Theory 
Agency theory can be used in supply chain research to 
assess the situation where the focal firm delegates 
responsibility and accountability to their suppliers to 
manage processes further downstream in the supply chain. 
A decentralised coordination structure requires significant 
delegation and responsibility to tier 1 suppliers. The 
complexity that arises as a result of this delegation 
downstream of the supply chain can be analysed from an 
agency theory perspective. Eisenhardt’s [22] agency 
theory focuses on the potential for conflicting interests 
that may arise when one entity delegates authority to a 
second to act on its behalf. Supply chain members are left 
to choose between activities that benefit their organization 
or the supply chain as a whole [38].  This becomes an 
issue as the focal firm cannot monitor the actions of their 
suppliers without an associated cost. Agency theory can 
also be applied to consider the problem of risk sharing 
that can arise when the focal firm and suppliers have 
different attitudes toward risk [22]. From this perspective 
supply risk is associated with the variability of outcomes, 
lack of knowledge of potential outcomes and the 
uncontrollability of supply chain partners [87]. The issues 
arise when organisations are not able to recover quality 
from the negative effects of disruptions [32], which 
include financial losses, negative corporate image, and a 
loss in demand [36]. 
Reward structures and risk sharing are important aspects 
to consider when assessing contracts that act as a means 
of governance in supplier relationships. Empirical 
evidence suggests when a focal firm has an opportunistic 
mentality it leads to negative economic consequences for 
the relationship between buyer and supplier [55]. In 
supply relationships, organisations that do not focus 
resources in establishing relationships with their suppliers 
are at an increased risk, as governance mechanisms such 
as trust and loyalty do not exist. The relative cost saving 
gained by consistently engaging suppliers that provide the 
lowest unit price may not provide the best outcome in the 
long term. 
3.2      Transaction Cost Theory 
 
Transaction cost theory is closely related to agency theory 
but more specifically covers the issues encountered within 
this research regarding governance in the supply chain 
context. Moreover, transaction cost theory provides a lens 
with which we can critically view investments in 
resources within inter-organisational relationships in 
SCM. Transaction cost theory suggests key characteristics 
that may arise from specific transactions across entities. 
There are two behavioural assumptions that are the basis 
for transaction cost theory [82]. Bounded rationality refers 
to how a complete evaluation of all the consequences of a 
particular transaction is not necessarily considered. In the 
context of this study, the impact of bounded rationality 
depends upon the knowledge of the end customer that the 
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focal firm can draw on in determining which products and 
supplier to choose for the manufacture of their products.  
Bounded rationality is also relevant where the focal firm 
has to consider whether to keep activities that are not 
within their core competency within their organisation, or 
whether to delegate these activities to suppliers. The lack 
of expertise in areas outside an organisations core 
competency creates a gap for opportunistic behaviour. 
Organisations are becoming increasingly inclined to 
outsource activities that are not within the scope of their 
core competence to maximise efficiencies.  Specific 
suppliers can use their knowledge and expertise to their 
advantage when liaising with the focal firm. A focal 
firm’s decision to keep activities within their organisation 
or delegate or outsource activities at a cheaper cost is a 
paradox faced by many. Hence bounded rationality 
provides a basis for behavioural uncertainty, which also 
strains buyer-supplier relationships.  
 
Williamson [82] considers that people act in self-interest 
that will be apparent in transactions. This can be the case 
when suppliers exaggerate their capabilities to the focal 
firm which would lead to an over commitment on the part 
of the focal firm. This issue of over commitment will 
eventually affect the focal firm if suppliers are not able to 
deliver components on time to the agreed specifications. 
Tier 1 suppliers can commit to the management of tier 2 
suppliers by accepting the responsibility for sub assembly, 
but these tier 2 suppliers will not have visibility of what 
the focal firm’s expectations are in regards to SCM 
activities. The focal firm has to trust their tier 1 supplier 
to act in the best interest of the focal firm by engaging sub 
tier suppliers that are aligned to the quality requirements 
of the focal firm.  
 
Incentives have been cited in the extant literature as 
mechanism with which to remove the opportunistic 
behaviour proposed by transaction cost theory [82].  
When manufacturers provide increased incentives to 
suppliers, there is an increased likelihood that the 
supplier’s decisions will support the manufacturer’s 
strategy [43]. The incentives provided can be in the form 
of mutual benefits that can be achieved through supply 
chain efficiencies.  
 
 
3.3      Coordination Theory 
The theoretical underpinning behind this paper is based 
on an exploration of coordination theory. Coordination in 
the supply chain involves the integration of financial, 
physical as well as informational flows along the supply 
chain. Malone & Crowston [51] coined the term 
coordination theory to analyse specific coordination 
mechanisms apparent in organisations. Coordination 
theory is built on the basis of understanding activities 
called coordination mechanisms, which are used to 
manage various interdependent activities and resources, 
as well as activities that directly contribute to the output 
of a process or task. In fact, coordination has been defined 
as managing dependencies among activities [51]. This 
definition is in line with a number of other organizational 
theorists who have similarly emphasized the importance 
of interdependence of organizational activities [75], [45].  
The context of this research considers coordination in 
relation to the complex products manufacturing industry, 
which poses specific regulatory considerations. 
Coordination is imperative in the supply chain otherwise 
“Just-in-Time processes fail, production stops, and any 
planned mutual advantage cannot be achieved” [54]. The 
extant literature proposes a number of different supply 
chain coordination structures, while we do not refute their 
existence they are not particularly relevant to this research 
context so we aim to focus on coordination structures that 
we believe to be essential in real supply chains. The first 
coordination structure is defined as a centralised 
coordination structure [52], [81], [4].  A centralised 
coordination structure refers to the situation where the 
focal firm makes all the decisions using information 
gathered from all entities.  The second, a decentralised 
coordination structure involves individual entities making 
their own decisions based solely on their local knowledge 
[52], [81], [4]. A third fully distributed coordination 
structure for decision-making is proposed by Anand & 
Mendelson [4].  A fully distributed coordination system is 
where all the data is shared end-to-end; hence each entity 
makes decisions based on all the data and knowledge 
available. 
Examples of coordination theory have been studied 
through the application of one or more of the theoretical 
structures mentioned above. Stank, Crum & Arango [71] 
studied the inter-firm coordination processes that exist as 
a result of effective communication, information 
exchange, partnering and performance monitoring in the 
supply chain. Cheng, Federgruen & Zheng [16] examine 
the value of coordination for a distribution system with 
one supplier and multiple retailers. Simatupang, Sandroto 
& Lubis [67] assess how supply chain coordination is 
driven by determinants, namely the association of supply 
chain coordination with responsibility interdependence, 
uncertainty and inter-functional conflict. Howleg & Pil 
[33] assess coordination in the supply chain from a 
theoretical perspective when looking at information and 
physical flows as well as the complex rationales driving 
supply chain evolution. 
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4. Research Aims and Objectives 
This research considers a company in the Australian 
complex (or advanced) products manufacturing industry 
as the focal firm, and considers respective downstream 
suppliers (tier 1 and tier 2), refer to Figure 1. The 
complex product manufacturing industry is particularly 
interesting as it is characterized by rapid technological 
change and rapid pace of innovation, both of which 
renders supply chain scalability, flexibility and adaptation 










Focal Firm Tier 1 Tier 2 
Physical Material Flow 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of Downstream Supply Chain in the 
Australian complex products manufacturing industry. 
It is this context that this paper seeks to investigate the 
prevalence in practice of a centralised, decentralised and 
or collaborative supply chain structures as identified by 
coordination theory. In doing so, we examine the potential 
opportunities and pitfalls that exist with the adoption of 
one or the other coordination structure in regards to 
specific supply chain activities (refer to Figure 2). This 
paper will demonstrate a number of hypotheses as a direct 
result of the observations from the exploratory case study. 
We will then demonstrate the need for further research in 
this field. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a framework representing the link 
between the coordination structure and specific supply 
chain activities. 
The next section will develop the assumptions and 
meanings behind each coordination structure. 
5. Theory Building 
 
5.1  Coordination in the Supply Chain re-defined 
SCM literature reveals that there is a lack of information 
available on the structures required to successfully 
manage tier 2 suppliers, as the emphasis is mainly on tier 
1 suppliers [67]. Ineffective knowledge transfer between 
manufacturers and tier 2 suppliers leads to decision-
making based on assumptions, which in turn contributes 
to wastage of resources [83]. Moreover, the lack of 
consideration of tier 2 suppliers by the focal firm leaves 
room for uncertainties [42]. Direct communication with 
tier 2 suppliers is pivotal in the supply chain for the focal 
firm to supply products to its end customer. The focal 
firm needs to understand that without consideration of tier 
2, they could face a situation where their lack of 
knowledge of their sub tier suppliers leads to poor quality 
deliverables to end customer. The search for stable 
relationship mechanisms has arisen as a result of the 
impossibility for one company to have control of the 
productive flow of materials, from raw material supply to 
final product [9]. The next section will delve deeper into 
the proposed coordination structures to re-define the 
concepts in the context of this study. 
5.2 Focal  Coordination Structure  
As discussed earlier in this section, the centralised 
coordination structure refers to the focal firm making all 
the decisions by using all the data available. The channel 
integrator approach is where one party, the focal firm, 
plays the key role in the supply chain by initiating direct 
contact and communication with many nodes along the 
supply chain [20]. The focal firm in this type of structure 
works closely with all entities in the supply chain.   The 
theoretical concepts of the centralised decision making [4] 
and the channel integrator approach [20], coupled with 
case study analysis, was applied to coin a new 
coordination structure namely, a focal coordination 
structure, which is defined as: 
The focal firm centrally coordinates supply chain 
operations for the supply chain based on information 
collected by themselves and from suppliers  
As the focal firm is the closest to the end customer, it is 
expected that the focal firm would have access to 
extensive and highly valuable customer data. This 
customer data could be in the form of market research that 
demonstrates customer preferences, which directly 
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impacts the supply chain in its ability to forecast demand.. 
Therefore a focal coordination structure would entail the 
focal firm making decisions in regards to product design 
and demand planning (Refer to Figure 3a). This 
coordination structure is conducive to the focal firm 
taking on all accountability to coordinate and transfer 
information across their tier 1, tier 2 and beyond 
suppliers. In doing so, although the focal firm has 
visibility of all processes in tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers, tier 
1’s knowledge of tier 2 is minimal. 
 
Figure 3a. Application of the focal coordination 
structure. 
 
5.3 Mediated  Coordination Structure  
Anand & Mendelson [4] defined a decentralised 
coordination structure as occurring when an entity makes 
decisions based on its own knowledge. A dyadic 
management approach involves the focal firm managing 
suppliers in which they have immediate contact, their tier 
1 suppliers [20]. These tier 1 suppliers are then expected 
to work closely to manage their immediate suppliers, and 
so forth [20]. The concept of a decentralised coordination 
structure and a dyadic management approach [20], 
coupled with case study analysis was used to define a 
mediated coordination structure as:   
Individual entities in the supply chain have the 
responsibility to coordinate their activities with their 
respective supplier based on information provided by this 
supplier. 
By this proposed definition, the focal firm expects their 
suppliers to be accountable for their own respective 
supply chain partners (Refer to Figure 3b). Although this 
supply chain structure passes the responsibility of the 
management of tier 2 suppliers to the tier 1 suppliers, a 
gap is present where the focal firm has little information 
or visibility of the tier 2 supplier. 
 
 
Figure 3b. Application of the mediated coordination 
structure. 
 
5.4 A Fully Distributed Coordination Structure 
as a Collaborative Coordination Structure  
For the purpose of this research, we propose that the fully 
distributed coordination structure defined by Anand & 
Mendelson [4] can be linked to the concept of 
collaboration as defined by Cao & Zhang [13] in the 
context of SCM. In both cases, we are referring to the 
amalgamation of supply chain operations decision-
making with close information exchange to ensure the 
achievement of common goals and mutual benefits. In the 
context of this study, we propose that the two concepts of 
a fully distributed coordination structure and collaboration 
can be paralleled.  
Managers have used collaboration in the supply 
chain/networks as a way to leverage the knowledge and 
resources inherent among supply chain members [1], [2]. 
The term supply chain collaboration has been defined by 
Cao & Zhang [13] “as a partnership process where two or 
more autonomous firms work closely to plan and execute 
supply chain operations toward common goals and mutual 
benefits.” Some research studies have defined 
collaboration as a strategy [34]; however, we apply the 
concept of collaboration as a form of supply chain 
structure. Studies such as Moody [56] have used the terms 
“collaborative structure” or “collaborative network” in the 
context of their research and hence provide support for 
the use of collaboration in the context of our research. We 
define the third coordination structure, a collaborative 
coordination structure as follows: 
A collaborative coordination structure when all supply 
chain members share all the information available to them 
to jointly make supply chain decisions. 
This structure implies that all the data is shared so that 
partners can make informed decisions on supply chain 
operations based on all the data and knowledge available 
to the supply chain (Refer to Figure 3c.) 
 
Figure 3c. Application of the collaborative coordination 
structure.  
 
6. Valuing Adding Activities in SCM 
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The integration and coordination of entities along the 
supply chain is multifaceted. An understanding of the 
benefits of coordination promotes organizational 
relationships in order to encourage the sharing of 
information [64].  A supply chain is considered 
coordinated when all supply chain activities are aligned to 
meet system objectives [86], [46]. Supply chain activities 
include routine processes that are undertaken in order to 
ensure effective SCM.  
Governance mechanisms are context specific in supply 
chain entities and hence a mismatch of governance 
structure causes performance losses, such as product 
design and delivery, in processes and workflows with 
external suppliers [43]. Quality and supply risk 
management are key components of SCM that are 
required for efficient SCM [24], [41], [39]. It is important 
to define the appropriate level of supplier involvement in 
order to gain maximum benefit [84]. The four 
aforementioned value adding activities in SCM are among 
others that have been cited in the literature, such as 
relationship management [70]; however in the context of 
this study we will consider a rather limited scope of the 
SCM activities. Next we will consider all four supply 
chain activities that we perceive to add significant value 
in SCM and their linkage to coordination structures. 
6.1 Governance 
Governance structures play an important role in 
maintaining structure and conduct for supply chain 
partners. Control structures that govern buyer-supplier 
relations are important, including joint planning, joint 
problem solving, collaborative communication and legal 
contract [12]. Governance mechanisms such as 
formalization, centralization and clannish behaviour 
provide certainty regarding roles and procedures for 
making decisions [69]. Formal contracts are not as 
influential as implicit contracts based on a set 
understanding [50]. In accordance with relational 
exchange theory, trust is a governance mechanism used to 
remove opportunistic behaviour from supply relationships 
[14], [2]. Various processes can be used to enhance 
coordination and compliance among supply chain partners 
such as open communication, trust, and transparency.  
In a mediated coordination structure, responsibility and 
decision-making is delegated to suppliers, who have the 
most intimate knowledge of their surroundings (Hayek, 
1945). Manufacturers requiring timely decision-making 
based on specialised information to operate in 
increasingly competitive environments will follow this 
strategy [48].  
An aspect of this delegation responsibility given to 
suppliers is trust. Trust is important and can itself act as a 
self-enforcing contract that reduces vulnerabilities that 
exists in supply chain structures [14], [58]. Moreover, 
trust is necessary to remove opportunistic behaviour from 
supply relationships [14]. Hence, we propose that giving 
trust and responsibility to suppliers to manage their 
supply chain based on their specific knowledge, acts as 
effective governance mechanisms for supply chain 
management. 
6.2 Supply Risk Management Practices 
In recent times SCM has been proven to be no longer 
reactive to apparent risks but proactive in communicating 
with entities in the supply chain to identify and minimize 
the risks involved [88]. The effect of external events on 
supply chain has led to an increase in literature on supply 
risk [18]. A study of the effects of supply chain 
complexity found that poor information linkages and 
inflexible production systems can cause uncertainty in 
management systems and lead to minor shortages in 
supply [78]. The relationship between supply chain risk 
and activities that cause supply chain vulnerability 
includes various characteristics such as a firm’s 
dependence on certain suppliers, the degree of single 
sourcing, or reliance on global supply chain sources, all 
contribute to supply chain risk [79].  U.S car 
manufacturer, Land Rover experienced significant supply 
chain disruptions in 2001 when one of their key suppliers 
of a Chassis, UPF-Thompson, filed for bankruptcy [66].  
Kull & Closs [42] consider exposure of supply risk in a 
decentralised supply chain environment when tier 2 
supplier failures occur and the impact it has on the supply 
chain. A practical example of supply risk that existed in a 
tier 2 supplier which mounted to millions of dollars’ 
worth of damage is in the case of the German components 
supplier Robert Bosch who in 2005 delivered defective 
high pressure pumps for diesel fuel injection systems 
[79], [76]. The consequences of recent SCM trends that 
are pro collaborative engagement in supply chain 
contribute to increased inter-firm dependence as well as 
the vulnerability of the supply chain in unexpected events 
[30],  [79].  Widely adapted concepts such as Just-In-
Time manufacturing in order to create lean supply chains 
results in low inventories but add to supply chain 
vulnerability, due to a lack of safety stock with this type 
of supply chain configuration.  
In a focal coordination structure, the decision-making 
responsibility is focused and centralised to one area of the 
supply chain. Here we suppose that the delegation of 
responsibility to various suppliers downstream will 
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increase the level of uncertainty in the supply chain as 
different decision-makers have different information and 
therefore would assess this information based on different 
assumptions [4]. An assessment of supply risk would take 
into consideration available resources, number of 
suppliers, competitive demand, make or buy opportunity, 
storage risks and substitution possibilities [41].  
6.3 Quality Management Practices 
The purpose of quality assurance activities and processes 
lies in their ability to contribute to the synchronization of 
inter-organizational operations by documenting processes, 
clarifying ambiguities and clearly defining responsibilities 
[27]. The implementation and maintenance of effective 
inter-organizational quality assurance programs has faced 
failure rates as high as 80% [37]. Empowerment and 
teamwork is the key to meeting quality objectives in 
organisations. This level of empowerment is not provided 
by a focal coordination structure as tier 1 suppliers are not 
responsible for quality outcomes of products of their tier 2 
supplier.  
Honda requires tier 1 suppliers to manage tier 2 suppliers 
as well as define common objectives and communicate 
Honda’s quality performance metrics, delivery schedules, 
and other information to its suppliers [63]. Dell’s 
approach to quality management is considered best 
practice in the way that they launched a Critical Supplier 
Partnership Program and saw a significant improvement 
in quality metrics. This Critical Supplier Partnership 
Program included fact finding, sharing of initial ideas, 
getting input and ownership from many areas with people 
at Dell and at the suppliers [73]. In the process Dell was 
able to develop specific processes to ensure adequate 
attention to strategic issues such as partnership growth, 
capacity planning, sharing of technology growth plans, 
software links and process improvement [73]. 
A mediated coordination structure would be most 
effective in managing quality.   Quality management 
requires a decentralised approach where responsibility for 
performance in regards to quality needs to be delegated to 
the source [49], [24]. Context specific information is 
pivotal so that problem-solving action can be taken 
immediately and hence improves quality performance and 
outcomes for the entire supply chain. In a focal 
coordination structure, quality issues from the tier 2 
supplier, that affects the tier 1 supplier, would be dealt 
with by the focal firm excluding the tier 1 supplier.  
6.4 Supplier Involvement Practices 
Mechanisms for coordinating the decisions on product 
design, manufacturing and delivery capabilities are still 
largely undetermined [60]. However, the rationale for 
involving suppliers at an early stage allows the focal firm 
to reduce its workload and focus on activities of core 
competence but also capitalise on the competencies and 
expertise of suppliers. The involvement of suppliers in 
product development allows for suppliers to gain an 
understanding of the culture of the focal firm, their 
requirements, and decision-making patterns which allows 
them to adjust and apply resources in the way that best 
suits the focal firm. However the involvement of suppliers 
in this phase is not regarded as easy. There are significant 
drawbacks in supplier involvement in product 
development where both the focal firm and supplier risk a 
loss of proprietary knowledge. The focal firm also has a 
reduction in the control over the development process. 
Gadde & Snehota [25] also agree that supplier 
involvement can be a resource demanding strategy. 
Wynstra & ten Pierick [84] argue that too much or too 
little of a particular resource allocated for supplier 
involvement practices is not effective in managing these 
engagements.  
A focal coordination structure implies that the focal firm 
will make all decisions and hence not include suppliers in 
the product development stage. Research demonstrates 
that successful companies use suppliers’ knowledge and 
input to gain optimum outcomes in the new product 
development stages [60]. Suppliers that are effectively 
integrated into supplier involvement practices at the focal 
firm can assist them to achieve the improvements 
necessary to remain competitive [29]. A focal 
coordination structure could face challenges in 
interpreting the diverse information that is necessary for 
optimizing the supply chain.  Hence, it is important to 
demonstrate empirically how far a lack of supplier 
involvement practices can negatively impact the focal 
firm. 
The next section seeks to explore the prevalence of the re-
defined coordination structures in the complex product 
manufacturing industry through two exploratory case 
studies, which then facilitates our hypothesis for future 
research. 
7. Exploratory Case Studies 
 
7.1 Research Method 
An exploratory case study was conducted in the 
Australian complex product manufacturing industry. The 
use of a case study methodology is highly relevant for the 
research at hand as it poses questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
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and ‘the focus is on a contemporary phenomena’ within a 
real-life context [85]. Moreover our approach to interview 
the focal firm as well as their suppliers ensures that the 
issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety 
of lenses, which allows for multiple facets of the 
phenomena to be revealed and understood [11]. This 
methodology was chosen to understand whether our 
theoretical coordination structures existed in practise. 
Interviews were conducted on a focal firm (Company X) 
and their respective tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers.  
Company X is a leader in the significant manufacturing of 
complex products with a multitude supply chain. Details 
of case studies and interviews conducted are listed below 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of Sampling Frame  
 
All suppliers interviewed were suppliers of components in 
Company X’s custom design product range, as well as 
categorised as a high spend suppliers; hence Company X 
allocates significant resources towards supplier 
management. Interviews were conducted on a one on one 
basis with the researcher and interviewees selected on the 
basis of their interaction with the respective focal firm 
and or sub-suppliers. The total sample size of the 
interviewees was eleven. All interviews were done using 
a semi-structured questionnaire and lasted thirty-five to 
forty-five minutes. 
7.2 Findings – Case Study 1 
Company X has customised product specifications for 
both tier 1 and tier 2 products and has self-sourced the 
components required for their manufacture. Company X 
places orders directly with the tier 2 supplier for these 
components, who then delivers components to the tier 1 
supplier for subassembly. In conversations with the tier 1 
supplier, it was clear that the tier 1 supplier had no direct 
relationship with this tier 2 supplier unless the situation 
was critical and their involvement was necessary. 
“It was only during real critical issues when things were 
out of control that we were involved in the discussion” 
All concerns that the tier 1 and tier 2 supplier had with 
each other were generally raised directly with Company 
X. From the perspective of tier 2, it was clear that they 
felt their customer was the focal firm and not the tier 1 
supplier where their components were being used during 
sub-assembly.  
“If we have any issues like delivery issues, quality issues 
or pricing issues we will go back to Company X because 
at the end of the day, they are the final customer, whereas 
tier 1, they are doing the final assembly”. 
A Company X manager explained that there are a number 
of reasons why the company has used a centralised 
approach to manage their tier 2 suppliers. Company X has 
previously used cost justifications to support this 
structure. Being a large company, Company X is able to 
negotiate competitive prices for expediting products that 
the tier 1 supplier cannot. The value of lower component 
prices is a direct benefit to Company X. Further, many of 
the tier 1 suppliers fall under the category of SME’s and 
therefore do not have the capabilities or the finances to 
purchase and manage large amounts of stock. From a 
strategic perspective, Company X may require more or 
less stock than what is proposed in the forecast. Therefore 
with direct control of their tier 2 suppliers, Company X 
can alter the amount of stock required by their tier 1 
supplier. This is a significant strategic advantage as often 
tier 1 suppliers may not foresee changing market 
conditions that the end customer, Company X, may be 
privy too. 
However, this focal coordination has significant 
drawbacks, which are represented clearly in this present 
case study. Members of the procurement team at 
Company X acknowledge the fact that the tier 1 supplier 
is out of the loop. With Company X sending their 
purchasing requirements directly to the tier 2 supplier, but 
the products being sent directly from tier 2 to tier 1, 
Company X has no visibility or traceability of the 
component until it is booked in, based on what tier 1 
reports. This is a significant drawback as Company X 
spends a considerable amount of money in purchasing 
inventory from the tier 2 suppliers that Company X 
themselves do not see. 
Furthermore, the supply chain structure is managed such 
that the present tier 1 supplier does not have any 
responsibility or accountability for the products that it 
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receives from the tier 2 supplier. The relationship between 
buyers and suppliers exists only between the Company X 
and the tier 2 supplier. When the focal firm request the 
tier 1 supplier to conduct a risk assessment of their tier 2 
supplier, they did not want to take accountability because 
the tier 2 supplier was chosen by the focal firm.  The tier 
1 supplier in this context felt that conducting a risk 
assessment for the focal firms supply chain was the 
responsibility of the focal firm itself. 
“We do not conduct risk assessment for tier 2 suppliers. 
That was a responsibility that Company X needed to take 
on because we didn’t choose them.” 
This significant gap in information flow poses an issue 
because of the lack of communication and coordination 
that exists between tier 1 and tier 2 when Company X is 
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Physical Material Flow 
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Figure 4. Illustration represents the lack of information 
flow linkage between tier 1 and tier 2 in a focal 
coordination structure. 
As a result of the lack of coordination among tier 1 and 
tier 2, in the situation where tier 1 does not take 
responsibility for communicating faulty component 
information to tier 2, there is a significant loss in the  
potential for improvements.  
“As a result of this scrap process reject at tier 1 being 
recognized only after the subassembly, Company X is 
unable to claim credit for the faulty parts at tier 2.” 
This demonstrates that the management of this present 
relationship between tier 1 and tier 2 adds significant 
implicit and explicit costs. In this case study it was 
evident that the tier 1 supplier wanted to take on greater 
responsibility for their processes and the management of 
tier 2 suppliers. The inclusion of tier 1 in the design 
processes was believed to provide better final products for 
Company X. 
“The benefit to us is that we would be designing a more 
robust product. The current product we supply to 
Company X was completely designed with the product 
development team and very little involvement with tier 1, 
subsequent to that we’ve had a lot of problems moulding 
the product. …in hindsight that would have simplified the 
design process …and the final product would be a lot 
cheaper.” 
7.3 Findings – Case Study 2 
The tier 1 supplier issues purchase orders directly to tier 2 
based on their requirements.  The tier 1 supplier for the 
case study works closely with Company X on projects 
where they are considered to have a close working 
relationship. The tier 1 supplier was said to spend a lot of 
time at Company X’s manufacturing site. The nature of 
the product that Company X receives from tier 1 made it 
pivotal to have technical support. The tier 1 supplier is 
then expected by Company X to manage their respective 
suppliers (tier 2).   
The components that the tier 2 supplier provides are based 
on specifications that are received from Company X. In 
this scenario, as a result of the lack of visibility of tier 2 
by Company X, they communicate directly with tier 2 to 
understand operational issues or concerns in regards to 
component specifications. In doing so, the tier 1 supplier 
then is often not in the loop for vital information. 
Information exchanges that are taking place between tier 
2 and Company X are unknown to tier 1 and hence feel as 
though they are not in the loop for relevant information 








Physical Material Flow 
 
Figure 5. Illustration represents the lack of information 
flow linkage between tier 2 and the focal firm in a 
mediated coordination structure. 
In this case, the tier 1 supplier feels they have to be 
prompted by tier 2 supplier for information in regards to 
Company X, which is often not ideal. The lack of clear 
communication and information transfer between them 
and Company X provides a challenge in this structure.   
“It is dangerous for Company X to go to tier 2 and not 
tier 1 supplier. Because if there any changes set in place 
there and no tells the tier 1 supplier, then that leads to 
other issues such as wrong information going into 
certificate of conformances or mis-delivery because there 
could be changes there. So this is dangerous.” 
When Company X is said to communicate directly with 
tier 2 suppliers, it reduces the responsibility and 
accountability provided to the tier 1 supplier. The tier 1 
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supplier not only feels like they have the capabilities to 
manage tier 2 in this respect but also believes that it will 
reduce cost and effort at Company X.  
“We (tier 1) have the capabilities to manage our 
suppliers. It would free up a lot of bandwidth that we can 
then channel that energy into other areas of our business 
where we are involved with Company X”  
In this case study, tier 1 was considered to be proactive in 
raising quality concerns to both Company X and tier 2 
when these issues arose. This level of proactive effort 
demonstrated by tier 1 can be attributed to the level of 
responsibility that has been provided to them by 
Company X.   
“Tier 1 will arrange for their manufacturer (tier 2 
supplier) to help us with our concerns (Company X) by 
direct site visit to us or teleconference.” 
8. Research Analysis 
Through the exploratory case studies, this research is able 
to show that despite the focal firm for both case studies 
being the same, we cannot assume that one coordination 
structure can explicitly apply to all component supply 
chains. For this reason, even in a situation where both 
components are customised products, we can see the 
existence of two coordination structures. Furthermore, 
this study illustrated a more holistic understanding of tier 
1 and tier 2 supply chain perspectives as opposed to other 
studies such as Anderson & Christensen [5] whose 
methodology only considered the perspective of tier 1 
suppliers and did not take into account the perspectives of 
tier 2 suppliers. In adopting a focal coordination structure 
we can see that this approach may provide reduced 
environmental uncertainty because of the accountability 
and control being centred in one area. Supply risk is more 
highly associated with a mediated coordination structure 
because of its contribution to a bullwhip affect [76]. Thus 
we can attribute supply risk management as an 
opportunity for a focal coordination structure. 
Supplier involvement practices are minimal in the focal  
coordination structure where the focal firm makes all the 
decisions in regards to product specifications to 
operational supply chain activities. This proves to be 
problematic in some cases where tier 1 suppliers have the 
capabilities to provide sourcing and design contributions 
with a potential to decrease time to market and reduced 
cost [84]. In a mediated coordination structure, trust in the 
form of responsibility for coordinating suppliers is given 
to tier 1 suppliers. Hence, we propose that governance 
mechanisms such as trust can be attributed to a mediated 
coordination structure. The use of trust as a governance 
mechanism can effectively reduce the exploitation of 
resources in partner firms in the supply chain.  A lack of 
governance through trust as seen in the focal coordination 
structure was evident in case study 1 through the lack of 
direct engagement of tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers. Finally, 
we propose that the level of accountability that is given to 
tier 1 suppliers in a mediated coordination structure can 
also be related to improved quality management. A lack 
of responsibility in tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers for the 
quality management programs causes poor quality 
management.  Table 2 shows a summary of the findings 
established through extant literature and the exploratory 
case studies. 
Table 1. Summary of propositions from literature and 
exploratory case studies  
 
These case studies have provided insight into scenarios 
where the focal firm maintains control and responsibility. 
We propose that the instinct of organisations in the 
complex product manufacturing industry is to expect 
visibility of their suppliers as a result of external 
regulatory and quality requirements by their industry 
specific standards. External regulatory bodies are among 
the institutions that demand companies have visibility of 
their component suppliers to ensure traceability. Hence, 
organisations in the complex product manufacturing 
industry are left to balance between maintaining 
competitiveness by focusing on core competencies such 
as R&D, and coordinating the operational level supply 
chain activities. 
9. Future Research and Implications 
Further empirical evidence is required to solidify the 
prevalence of our re defined coordination structures and 
their suitability in different industry contexts. 
Consequently, based on the literature review and the 
exploratory case studies demonstrated in the previous 
section, further research can be conducted to address the 
following research hypothesis: 
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H1.  Effective governance in the supply chain is 
positively associated with a mediated coordination 
structure. 
H2.  Supply risk is negatively associated with a focal 
coordination structure. 
H3. Quality management is positively associated with a 
mediated coordination    structure. 
H4. Supplier involvement practices are negatively 
associated with a focal coordination structure. 
Our hypothesis focuses on the existence of two supply 
chain structures as there was no evidence of a true 
collaborative coordination structure in practice in our case 
study. We attribute this to the significant financial 
investment and complexities associated with a 
collaborative coordination structure and the stringent 
regulatory conditions of the complex product 
manufacturing industry. In practice, companies often 
struggle to adopt the ideal supply chain structure as the 
rapid pace of their growth renders their structure to be ad 
hoc as opposed to strategy based [48]. A number of 
studies have considered collaborative efforts to show 
considerable value added benefits in regards to SCM 
activities. For example, a study by Nyaga, Whipple & 
Lynch [58] show that dedicated investments in the 
collaborative structure has a positive impact on 
demonstrating commitment by the firm. However, it is 
important not to be blindsided about the potential pitfalls 
that exist with a collaborative structure as the 
implementation of such collaborative coordination 
structure has its challenges [19]. Studies have shown that 
collaborative supply chains are often initiated without 
consideration of the selection criteria of the supply chain 
partners, matching inter-organisational needs and 
capabilities, and without clearly defined standards, goals, 
and implementation procedures to cover the long term 
strategic horizon [21]. This creates room for a wider 
discussion around whether supply chain collaboration is 
able to benefit all members equally. Partnering can be 
unsuccessful as a result of over powering by a certain 
party, a lack of communication, lack of honesty about 
established goals, as well as poor performance [77].  
Therefore, we propose that further research should study 
the prevalence of the third collaborative coordination 
structure, as well as its potential variance in its 
applicability to different industry sectors. From our 
exploratory case study, suppliers in a focal coordination 
structure were not conducting supply risk assessment, as 
it was a delegated responsibility of the focal firm. Further 
analysis needs to be conducted to assess the association 
between risk and a collaborative coordination structure. 
We posit that the lack of prevalence of a collaborative 
coordination structure may be attributed to the fact that 
risk is positively associated with a collaborative 
coordination structure. Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H5. Supply risk is positively associated with a 
collaborative coordination structure. 
Furthermore, through case study 2 it was clear that the tier 
1 suppliers’ contributions in the design phase of product 
development increased the value of the product. From this 
we can consider that the contribution of both tier 1 and 
tier 2 suppliers in the design phase would result in further 
value in supplier involvement practices, hence we 
hypothesise also that: 
H6. Supplier involvement practices are positively 
associated with a collaborative coordination structure.  
Another consideration for further research is off-shoring. 
The application of coordination structures in the context 
of off-shore suppliers (tier 1 and tier 2) could potentially 
demonstrate dissimilar attributes. Off shoring in particular 
requires correct processes as a result of the specific 
operational and structural risks that it poses to supply 
chains [7]. Hence we propose that off-shoring has the 
potential to impact upon the coordination structure and 
further research in this area is required to ascertain the 
key requirements in terms of structure for organisations 
that are pursuing off shoring strategies. 
10. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper was to understand 
which approaches to coordination structures was existent 
in practice. Previous studies have only considered the 
theoretical implications of coordination structures [4], 
[81]. This study delves into an examination of the 
implications that can be attributed to supply chain 
structures that are evident in a complex product 
manufacturing company. The context of this research had 
huge implications on the outcome for this research.  This 
study has specifically operationalised potential 
opportunities and pitfalls of a focal coordination structure 
and mediated coordination structure in the context of the 
complex product manufacturing industry. Finally, this 
study showed the reality of more than one supply chain 
coordination structure in a focal firm demonstrating that 
there is no such coordination structure that can be 
applicable to all component supply chains. 
This research is important in the context of SCM as it 
demonstrates to supply chain managers the prevalence of 
such coordination structures and the opportunities and 
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pitfalls that result. By understanding the particular 
implications of specific coordination structures, 
organisations will be able to better allocate resources, 
integrate information and knowledge, align practices and 
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